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Abstract
Background Risk and Trading in a Full-Information Rational
Expectations Economy
In this paper, we assume that investors have the same information, but trade due to the
evolution of their non-market wealth. In our formulation, investors rebalance their portfolios
in response to changes in their expected non-market wealth, and hence trade. We assume
an incomplete market in which risky non-market wealth is non-hedgeable and independent
of market risk, and thus represents an additive background risk. Investors who experience
positive shocks to their expected wealth buy more stocks from those who experience less
positive shocks. The extent of trading depends on the heterogeneity of the shocks to the
expected background risk across the agents. The demands of the two agents are convex
or concave in the state of the economy, which justifies trading in the aggregate assets and
contingent claims.
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1 Introduction
It has long been a challenge for financial economists to explain trading in the context of
rational expectations asset pricing models. For example, in the complete markets Arrow-
Debreu model, agents choose state-contingent claims on the initial date, but do not trade
at subsequent dates, since they have already purchased claims that hedge against various
future outcomes; thus, there is no need for them to adjust their portfolio holdings as the
state of the world is revealed. This inability to explain trading in a rational model flies
in the face of evidence that there is a large volume of trading in various securities: bonds,
stocks, and increasingly in various types of contingent claims, such as options and futures
contracts.
Several attempts have been made in the literature in the past to explain trading by relaxing
some of the assumptions of completeness of markets and information available to agents in
the economy. One possibility is that when investors have asymmetric information, this gives
them an incentive to trade in order to profit from that information. However, as Grossman
and Stiglitz (1980) point out, the mere act of trading reveals the information possessed
by a particular agent and this gets reflected in market prices. While there may be some
“sand in the gears” introduced if the process of expectations formation is noisy, the central
intuition that prices reflect private information still prevails, reducing the motivation to
trade substantially.
This argument was taken one step further by Milgrom and Stokey (1982) who argue that
when the agents begin with a Pareto optimal allocation relative to their prior beliefs, they
do not trade upon receiving private information, even at equilibria that are less than fully
revealing, since “the information conveyed by price changes swamps each traders private
information.” This surprisingly general result arises because if the initial allocation is Pareto
optimal, there is no valid insurance motive for trading. The willingness of other traders to
take the opposite side implies at least to one trader that his own bet is unfavorable. Hence
no trade is acceptable to all traders. The Milgrom and Stokey propositions rely on two
crucial assumptions: a) that it is common knowledge that when a trade occurs it is feasible
and acceptable to all agents, and b) the agents beliefs are concordant, i.e., that they agree
about how the information should be interpreted.
Another strand of the literature that has provided a motivation for trading is on market
micro-structure, most prominently by Kyle (1985) and Glosten and Milgrom (1985). These
models try to explain the bid-offer spread in markets by appealing to asymmetric informa-
tion. However, a crucial assumption in such models is the existence of noise traders, who
trade for liquidity reasons, and these are not explicitly modeled. Furthermore, it is unclear
why in such models, investors trade for liquidity reasons in risky securities such as stocks,
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rather than trading bonds, unless some market imperfection is assumed. In the Milgrom
and Stokey sense, it must be the case that the allocation in these models is not ex-ante
Pareto optimal, and/or that the beliefs are not concordant.
The broad conclusion from the information-based literature on trading is that the Milgrom
and Stokey “no-trade” result will obtain, unless there is some market imperfection, signifi-
cant deviation from rational expectations equilibria or an exogenous reason to trade, such
as liquidity motivations.
In this paper, we explore an alternative motivation for trading, which is the existence
of non-marketable wealth. Non-marketable wealth may take many forms, but the most
obvious example is wealth arising from labor income. Human capital, which is the value
of future labor income, has been shown in many studies, both theoretical and empirical,
to have an influence on portfolio demand. Another example is housing wealth, which is a
significant component of the portfolios of households. Again, there is a extensive literature
documenting how housing wealth affects portfolio choice and, in turn, feeds back on to
the equilibrium prices of traded assets. The effect of non-market wealth is that it alters
the agents’ demand for the traded assets. An early example of this distortion is the work
of Bodie, Merton and Samuelson (1992) in the context of non-stochastic, positive non-
marketable wealth, for an agent with constant relative risk aversion. They show that this
agent acts much like another agent with a lower, but increasing relative risk aversion.
The problem gets more complex when the non-marketable wealth has stochastic properties.
There is a extensive literature on background risk that studies the portfolio behavior of
agents with such non-marketable wealth, whose future cash flows are also stochastic. For
most common utility functions, the existence of background risk makes agents more risk
averse and hence reduces their demand for risky securities. 1 The natural question is how
the changes in the agents’ portfolio decisions affect the portfolio demand and sharing rules
of the marketable securities in equilibrium, a problem first analyzed by Franke, Stapleton
and Subrahmanyam (1998) [FSS].
We extend this framework to consider a multi-period version of the FSS framework. Fol-
lowing the outcome of the background risk in the intermediate period, agents adjust their
holdings of the marketable securities, to be in line with their new level of derived risk aver-
sion, in the presence of the updated distribution of background wealth. If the outcomes of
the background risk are heterogeneous across agents, it creates a motivation for trading,
as different agents may wish to adjust their portfolio holdings in opposite directions. We
explore this simple intuition formally for investors with constant relative risk aversion in
our analysis.
1See, for example, Gollier and Pratt (1996), Kimball (1993) and Eekhoudt, Gollier and Schlesinger (1996).
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The influence of a stochastic background risk on trading has also been considered by Wang
(1994). In Wang’s work, the non-tradable private risk provides information to some in-
vestors, and motivates information based trading. In contrast, in our model the back-
ground risk provides a non-information based motive for trade. In effect, the realization of
expected background risk changes the derived risk aversion and the prudence of the agents,
thus causes the trading. This holds even under the assumption of the zero correlation be-
tween background risk and aggregate risk, under which an information based model, such
as that in Wang (1994), there is no trading.
Section 2 presents the set up of the model and derives the portfolio demand for traded
state-contingent claims. Section 3 describes the evolution of the background risk over time
Section 4 derives optimal demand in the special case where all uncertainty of background
risk is resolved at time 1. Section 5 generalizes the results using an approximation. Section
6 presents our conclusions.
2 A Single-Period Model
In this section we derive the optimal demand for contingent claims for agents in a single-
period equilibrium economy. The results will provide the basic building block for our multi-
period trading model in later sections. The set-up of the model is similar to that in Franke,
Stapleton and Subrahmanyam (1998) [FSS].2 As in FSS, we assume that all agents maximize
the expected utility of wealth, w at the end of a single period. For agent i, wi = xi+εi, where
xi is a set of claims on a single aggregate market cash flow Xa and εi is the non-marketable
income, e.g. labor income. In general, the non-marketable income εi = E(εi) + ηi, where
E(εi) is the expected value of non-marketable income, and ηi is an independent, zero-mean
background risk. Each agent solves the following maximization problem:
max
xi
EXa [Eεi [u(wi)]], s.t. E[φ(Xa)xi] = E[φ(Xa)xˆi0], (1)
given an initial endowment of x, xˆi0. In (1), φ(Xa) is the forward pricing kernel with
E[φ(Xa)] = 1. The budget constraint states that the forward price of the chosen portfolio
of claims has to equal the forward value of the endowed claims. In FSS, agents have utility
functions ui(wi) which belong to the HARA class, excluding the exponential function. Here,
we assume essentially the same setup with
ui(wi) =
w1−γii
1− γi
. (2)
2However, we cannot simply use the results in FSS, since in that paper they do not solve for the Lagrangian
multipliers, see λi below. Hence, their results show that some investors buy, and some sell contingent claims,
but do not show how many claims are bought or sold.
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where γi is the coefficient of relative risk aversion. Utility for wealth is a power function,
exhibiting constant relative risk aversion, but the derived utility for xi is of the HARA form,
when the background risk εi does not exist.
3
Let λi be the Lagrangian multiplier associated with the budget constraint of investor i. The
Lagrangian multiplier is then:
L = ui(wi) + λi(E[φ(Xa)xˆi0]− E[φ(Xa)xi]). (3)
It follows that the first order condition of the optimization problem is:
Ee[(xi + E(εi) + ηi)
−γi ] = λiφ(Xa). (4)
Following Kimball (1990), we can define the precautionary premium ψi(xi) by the relation
Ee[(xi + E(εi) + ηi)
−γi ] ≡ [xi + E(εi)− ψi(xi)]
−γi (5)
Hence, [xi+E(εi)−ψi]
−γi is the certainty equivalent of Ee(xi+E(εi)+ηi)
−γi . Note that ψi
itself will be a function of xi and also depends on the distribution of ηi. More specifically,
the function ψ(·) is decreasing and convex. The above result differs slightly from FSS in
that we allow the mean of the background risk to be non-zero. This difference is essential
for our setting because in the dynamic case, analyzed in sections 3 and 4, the mean of the
background risk will be non-zero after the initial date.
Substituting the above certainty equivalence into the first order condition:
[xi + E(εi)− ψi]
−γ = λiφ(Xa), (6)
and it follows that the demand for contingent claims is given by:
xi = (λi)
−1/γiφ(Xa)
−1/γi − E(εi) + ψi. (7)
The optimal demand consists of three separate parts. The first term is the demand if the
expected non-marketable income is zero and the precautionary premium is also zero (i.e. the
background risk is zero). When the expected non-marketable income is positive (negative)
the demand is decreased (increased) in each state to compensate. This explains the second
term. The third term adjusts for the effect of the background risk.
3Utility is of the Hypobolic Absolute Risk Averse (HARA) class if
ui(wi) =
(wi + ai)
1−γi
1− γi
,
for some constant ai.
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To obtain the optimal demand, we need to solve for λi and the pricing kernel φ(Xa). It
turns out that it is more convenient to use the per capita term X, instead of the aggregate
Xa. Using the market clearing condition
1
I
∑
i xi = X, where I is the number of agents and
assuming γi = γ for all i, we have:
4
X = λ−1/γφ(X)−1/γ −A+ ψ, (8)
where
ψ =
1
I
∑
i
ψi, (9)
A =
1
I
∑
i
E(εi), (10)
λ−1/γ =
1
I
∑
i
λ
−1/γ
i . (11)
Note that the aggregate ψ is a function of the state indexed by X and depends also on
the distribution {ηi}i=1,...,n. This is essentially a representative agent version of equation
(7), assuming that all the γi’s are the same. Note also that we do not assume that the
background risks are identical across all agents. Indeed, in the subsequent analysis we will
use the fact that ai and ψi vary across agents to create an incentive to trade. Initially, the
agents are all identical in terms of their original risk aversion. However, the realization of
the background risks can differ and consequently the derived risk aversion can be different.
This is the basic intuition behind the trading in our model.
Solving (8) for φ we find
φ(X) = (X +A− ψ)−γλ−1. (12)
Now, substituting the solution of xi in (7) above back into the individual budget constraint
E[φ(X)xi] = E[φ(X)xˆi0],
it follows that:
E[φ(X)xˆi0] = E{φ(X)[λ
−1/γ
i φ(X)
−1/γ − E(εi) + ψi]}
= λ
−1/γ
i E[φ(X)
1− 1
γ ]− E[φ(X)E(εi)] + E[φ(X)ψi].
4One could still keep the general form of different γi at this stage, but the resulting expression would be
quite complicated.
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Then, we obtain the following:
λ
−1/γ
i =
E[φ(X)(xˆi0 +E(εi)− ψi)]
E[φ(X)
1− 1
γ ]
(13)
or λi =

E[φ(X)(xˆi0 + E(εi)− ψi)]E[φ(X)1− 1γ ]


−γ
(14)
Hence, the optimal individual investor demand is (using equation (12)):
xi =
E[φ(X)(xˆi0 + E(εi)− ψi)]
E[φ(X)
1− 1
γ ]
φ(X)
−
1
γ − E(εi) + ψi(xi) (15)
=
E[(X +A− ψ)−γ(xˆi0 + E(εi)− ψi)]
E[(X +A− ψ)1−γ ]
(X +A− ψ)− E(εi) + ψi. (16)
The expression for the demand for contingent claims in (16) is complex. If there were no
background risk for all investors, ψ would be zero and xi would be linear in X. However, in
general, both ψ and ψi are convex functions implying a non-linear demand function. Also,
the optimal demand is implicit, since ψi is a function of xi for each i.
Again, the optimal individual demand consists of three parts. The first term is linear in
per capita market cash flow. The coefficient depends on the expectation of the individual
precautionary premium. The second term is the adjustment for the non-zero expected
background risk, ai. The third term is the adjustment for individual precautionary premium.
3 The Evolution of Background Risk Over Time
So far, we have assumed that agents face a background risk εi which is resolved at the end
of a single period. We now introduce a multi-period model in which the risk, εi, evolves over
time. Specifically, there is non-zero conditional expectation E1(εi) known at time t = 1.
This is required to study trading volume in the following sections, since trading is essentially
an intertemporal issue.
There are three dates, t = 0, 1, 2 in the model. These are represented in the timeline below.
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t = 0
xˆi0, E0(εi) known
chosen xi0
given φ0(X), ψ0, ψi0
t = 1
E1(εi) known
chosen xi1
given φ1(X), ψ1, ψi1
t = 2
ηi = εi − E1(εi) known
xi1, εi realized
At time t = 0, each agent is endowed with xˆi0, which is a portfolio of marketable contingent
claims. Also, at t = 0, each agent knows about the distribution of the background risk εi,
which will be fully revealed at t = 2. The agent chooses a portfolio of marketable contingent
claims, at time 0, xi0, to maximize the expected utility of the wealth at time t = 2. The
maximization is given the pricing kernel φ0(X) and the precautionary premium ψi0. Note
that, all the payoffs, which include the payoff from the marketable contingent claims and
the background risk εi, are at t = 2.
At time t = 1, the agent receives information about her background risk, εi, and revises
her expectation of εi to E1(εi). Given this information and the revised distribution of the
background risk in light of the information, εi, she chooses a new portfolio of contingent
claims, given an updated pricing kernel φ1(X) and a revised precautionary premium, ψi1.
Then, at time t = 2, the agent receives more information about her background risk, ηi,
and both payments xi1 and εi are paid to the agent.
Note that, in this model, the agent knows about part of the final payoff from the background
risk at t = 1. Thus, E1(εi) is the conditional expectation at t = 1 of the background risk
at t = 2. However we should emphasize that even though the agent knows about E1(εi),
she cannot use it directly to trade the contingent claims because the risk is non-marketable.
However, the agent does change her optimal portfolio holdings of marketable claims at t = 1,
given the new information. This is the trading generated in this model.
We next assume that there are two groups of agents, which are indexed as i = m,n.5 We
denote the size of the two groups as M and N respectively. For simplicity, we assume that
ex ante at time t = 0, the initial endowment xˆi0 and the distributions of εi are the same
for the two groups i = m,n.
The trading that takes place at t = 1 depends on the cross-sectional realization of E1(εi)
across the agents. If it happens that the outcome E1(εi) is the same for both groups of
5The analysis can be easily extended to many groups at the expense of notational complexity. The
additional insight from the extension would be trivial.
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investors, there will be no incentive for the two groups to trade with each other. However,
if the realizations of E1(εi)’s are different for the two groups, then there will be trade
between them. We proceed by first considering a special case of this structure where the
precautionary premia at t = 1 are zero for all investors. This is the case where there is full
resolution of uncertainty about εi at t = 1.
4 A Special Case: Full Resolution of Background Risk at
Time 1
In this section, we investigate the case where all the uncertainty of εi is resolved at t = 1.
As discussed above, in the general case, the demand for contingent claims is an implicit
function. This is due to the demand is a function of the precautionary premium, but the
precautionary premium itself is a function of the demand. However, in the special case
where all the uncertainty of the background risk εi is resolved at t = 1, the precautionary
premium, ψi(xi), is zero by definition at time 1. So, in this case, there is an explicit solution
for the optimal demand at time 1.
At time 0, all the investors are identical, and only differ in the future resolution of the
uncertainty of εi at time t = 1. Since the investors are identical at t = 0, and εi has the
same distribution for all i, the investors must hold the same portfolios at t = 0. That
implies that the initial demand xi = X, since X is the average allocation of claims across
investors.
Now, denote the conditional expectation E1(εi) as ai. So the conditional expectations of
the two groups (E1(εm), E1(εn)) = (am, an). Using (16), with ψi = 0 and xˆi0 = X we have
the demand for agent m:
x∗m1 ≡
E1[(X +A)
−γ(X + am)]
E1[(X +A)1−γ ]
(X +A)− am, (17)
where
A =
Mam +Nan
M +N
(18)
is the average expected future non-marketable income, andM,N are the numbers of type-m
and type-n agents respectively. Namely x∗m1 refers to the demand in the special case when
all uncertainty of εi is resolved at t = 1.
This can be written as(using X + am = X +A+ am −A):
x∗m1 =
E1[(X +A)
−γ(X +A+ am −A)]
E1[(X +A)1−γ ]
(X +A)− am
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= X +A+ (am −A)
E1[(X +A)
−γ ]
E1[(X +A)1−γ ]
(X +A)− am
= X + (am −A)β(X +A)− (am −A), (19)
where
β =
E1[(X +A)
−γ ]
E1[(X +A)1−γ ]
(20)
is a constant.6 The demand of m-type agents is made up of three terms. The first term
is the agent’s initial allocation, X. Note that if the shock am equals the aggregate average
shock, A, then m-type agent’s demand is simply the initial allocation. She does not trade
and is left with her initial portion of claims. The second and third terms are dependent on
the divergence in the conditional expectated background risk between each m-type agent
and the market average. The second term is a linear demand for claims on X. Also, the
coefficient β depends on A, and is declining as A increases.7 The third, constant term,
am − A, represents a demand for risk-free income which balances the increase or decrease
in expected non-market wealth.
Similarly, the demand for agent n is
x∗n1 = X + (an −A)β(X +A)− (an −A), (21)
We now define the trading in contingent claims for an m-type agent, m, zm1, as the absolute
value of the difference between the demand xm,1 and her initial allocation X. From (19)
zm1 ≡ |x
∗
m1 −X| = |(am −A)β(X +A)− (am −A)|. (22)
Similarly, the trading for an n-type agent is
zn1 ≡ |x
∗
n1 −X| = |(an −A)β(X +A)− (an −A)|. (23)
The optimal demand and trading of the two types of agents are functions of the exogeneous
variables (am, an,M,N). However, an alternative and more economically meaningful set of
6For an agent with background income equal to the average A, β is the expected marginal (derived)
utility scaled by the expected (derived) utility.
7To see this is the case, note that
dβ
dA
=
−γE1[(X + A)
−1−γ ]
E1[(X + A)1−γ ]
−
(1− γ)[E1[(X + A)
−γ ]]2
[E[(X + A)1−γ ]]2
= −
γ[E1((X + A)
−1−γ)E1((X + A)
1−γ)− (E1((X +A)
−γ))2]
[E1[(X + A)1−γ ]]2
−
{E1[(X + A)
−γ ]}2
[E[(X + A)1−γ ]]2
Since E1((X +A)
−1−γ)E1((X +A)
1−γ)− (E1((X +A)
−γ))2 > 0 from the Cauchy-Schwartz inequality, the
first term − γ[E1((X+A)
−1−γ)E1((X+A)
1−γ)−(E1((X+A)
−γ))2]
[E1[(X+A)1−γ ]]2
is negative. It follows that dβ/dA < 0.
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exogeneous variables consists of the average expected background income A, the difference
between the expected background incomes of the two groups of agents, and the relative
number of m agents, M/N .
For convenience, we therefore define:
ρ ≡
M
N
(24)
as the relative number of m-type agents, and
∆ ≡ am −A (25)
as the deviation between the expected background income of an m-type agent, am, and the
average expected backgroun income of all agents, A. Finally we define |∆| as a measure of
heterogeity across the agents.
Given these definitions, we have:
Proposition 1 [Demand for Contingent Claims: Full Resolution Case] Assuming
full resolution of the uncertainty of background risk at time 1,
(a) the demand for contingent claims for agents in groups m and n is given by:
x∗m1 = X +∆β(X +A)−∆ (26)
x∗n1 = X − ρ∆β(X +A) + ρ∆, (27)
(b) and the trading of the agents is given by:
zm1 = |∆β(X +A)−∆| = |∆| · |β(X +A)− 1| (28)
zn1 = |ρ∆β(X +A)− ρ∆| = ρ|∆| · |β(X +A)− 1|. (29)
Proposition 1 follows directly from equations (19) and (21), after substituting (24) and
(25). Proposition 1(a) gives the t = 1 demand for state contingent claims on X for agents
in groups m and n, x∗m,1 and x
∗
n,1, in the case of full resolution of uncertainty. The demand
for claims in different states depends on the deviation, ∆, and ρ, the relative number of
agents in each group.
Proposition 1(b) shows the implications of the optimal demands for the trading of contingent
claims. The amount of trading of claims depends upon the heterogeneity of the two groups
of agents, measured by |∆|, and ρ, the relative number of agents of the two groups.
We now analyze the comparative static properties of the equilibrium in the following three
corollaries. First, we have:
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Corollary 1 [Changes in Heterogeneity and Trading]
Holding the average background income, A, and the relative numbers of agents, ρ fixed:
(a) the effect of a change in the difference, ∆, is given by:
∂x∗m1
∂∆
= β(X +A)− 1 (30)
∂x∗n1
∂∆
= −ρ(β(X +A)− 1), (31)
(b) the effect of a change in the heterogeneity, |∆|, on the trading is given by
∂zm1
∂|∆|
= |β(X +A)− 1| ≥ 0 (32)
∂zn1
∂|∆|
= ρ|β(X +A)− 1| ≥ 0, (33)
The corollary follows directly from the optimal demands and trading in Proposition 1.
Corollary 1(a) shows the effect of a change in the deviation ∆. When the deviation ∆
across agents increases (while holding the average A fixed), the m-type agents will demand
more claims on the high states of X, i.e. ∂x∗m1/∂∆ > 0 for high X, and demand less on the
low states of X. Hence, m-type agents buy more claims on the high states and sell more
claims on the low states, with n-type agents doing the opposite.
The intuition behind this result is as follows. First, suppose that ∆ < 0 and decreases. In
this case, the m-type agents are the poorer type and their expected background income,
am < 0, decreases. The reaction of m-type agents is to buy more claims on low states and
sell more claims on high states. Conversely, if ∆ increases, the m-type agents will sell more
claims on low states and buy more claims on high states. Alternatively, suppose that ∆ > 0
and increases. In this case, the poorer n-type agents buy more claims on low states and
sells more claims on high states. Hence, the richer m-type agents again sell more claims on
low states and buys more claims on high states as ∆ increases.
Corollary 1 (a) also implies that there exists a critical contingent claim X∗1 in which no
trade takes place. This “breakeven state” is given by the condition β(X∗1 +A) − 1 = 0. It
follows that
X∗1 ≡
1
β
−A. (34)
If there is an increase in ∆, for those states X > X∗1 , ∂zm1/∂∆ > 0. m-type agents will
demand more claims; and for those X < X∗1 , m-type agents will demand less claims.
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The second part of the Corollary, 1 (b), shows that trading of the agents increases when the
heterogeneity increases. Heterogeneity in the realization of expected background income is
the key motivation for agents to trade in this model. Note that in this case, the aggregate
economy is assumed to be the same, since we hold A, the average expected background
income, fixed.
Proposition 1 and Corollary 1 are illustrated in Figure 1, panel A.8 In this case, for simplicity,
we choose A = 0 and ρ = 1. Also ∆ = am−A < 0. The solid line shows the excess demand
(compared to the endowment) of an m-type agents when ∆ = −1.The agent buys claims in
the low states and sells claims in the high states. The dotted line represents the (symmetric)
excess demand of n-type agents. If the difference falls to ∆ = −3, the demand of an m-
type agents changes to that shown by the dashed line. The m-type agents increase their
demand for claims in the low states and increases sales of claims on the high states. This
increased hedging behavior is matched by the n-type agents who reduces their demand for
claims on income in the low states and increases demand for claims in the high states.The
dotted-dashed line shows the excess demand of the n-type agents.
We now assume that there exists some heterogeneity across the two types of agent and
examine the effect of a change in the average expected background income realization, A,
on the trading pattern of the agents. We have the following:
Corollary 2 [Changes in Average Expected Background Income and Trading]
Holding the difference, ∆, and the relative numbers of agents, ρ fixed:
(a) the effect of a change in the average expected background income, A, on the demand
for contingent claims is given by:
∂x∗m1
∂A
= ∆β[1− (γδ + (1− γ)β)(X +A)], (35)
∂x∗n1
∂A
= −ρ∆β[1− (γδ + (1− γ)β)(X +A)], (36)
where9
δ ≡
E(X +A)−1−γ
E(X +A)−γ
(37)
8The examples in Figures 1 and 2 are based on a simple 12-state case. Details are provided in the caption
of the figures.
9The term δ is analogous to the β definition earlier in equation (20), except that δ uses the marginal
(derived) utility function instead of the (derived) utility.
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(b) holding ∆, ρ fixed, if A changes, then the effect on the trading of the agents is:
∂z∗m1
∂A
= sign(∆(X −X∗1 ))∆β[1− (γδ + (1− γ)β)(X +A)], (38)
∂z∗n1
∂A
= −sign(∆(X −X∗1 ))ρ∆β[1− (γδ + (1− γ)β)(X +A)]. (39)
Corollary 2(a) shows the effect of a marginal change in average expected background income
on the demand for contingent claims of the two types of agent. To interpret the derivative
in (35), note that δ in (37) is positive, since X + A is positive. Moreover, comparing δ in
(37) with β in (20) we have δ ≥ β.10 It follows that γδ + (1− γ)β > 0. Hence, for ∆ < 0,
the derivative in (35) is negative for small X, and positive for large X.
The intuition for this result is as follows. Suppose that ∆ < 0 and A falls. Since the m-
type agents are poorer in prospects, they are relatively more affected by the fall in average
expected background income, and buy claims on low states from the n-type agents, who
are relatively less affected by the shock. They buy these low-state claims and sell claims on
the higher states.
Another way of interpreting the result is in terms of a wealth effect and a substitution effect
of the change in A. With an increase in A, the wealth effect for all agents is the same,
the greater the wealth, the lower the risk aversion, pushing up the demand for all claims.
However, the substitution effect is different for the two groups, depending on which group
experiences the bigger relative increase in wealth. With ∆ < 0 and hence am < an, the
effect on am is stronger, resulting in an increase in demand for low state claims from m-type
agents. This is matched by a decrease in the demand for such claims from n-type agents.
Corollary 2(b) summarizes the effect of a small change in average background income on
the trading activity of the two types of agent. For X < X∗1 , the term sign(∆(X − X
∗
1 ))
is positive (since ∆ < 0). The final term in square brackets is positive for small X and
negative for larger X. Hence, the trading in this region may increase or decline. However,
for X > X∗1 , the sign of (∆(X −X
∗
1 ) is negative and it follows that trading of claims in this
region increases.
Corollary 2(a) is illustrated in Figure 1, panel B, for the case where the average expected
background risk of agents changes from A = 0 to A = −1. When A = 0, the demands
for claims of the m-type and n-type agents are shown by the solid line and the dotted line
respectively. When A changes to A = −1, the demands are shown by the steeper dashed
and dotted-dashed lines, respectively. With A = 0, the cross-over state at which no trade
takes place is X∗1 (0). With A = −1, the cross-over state at which no trade takes place falls
10This follows from the Cauchy-Schwartz inequality, as shown in the Appendix A.
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to X∗1 (−1). The effect of the fall in A is to steepen the linear demand for contingent claims.
The m-type agents require more claims on the low states and these are supplied by the
relatively rich n-type agents.
The effect on the level of trading of such a finite change in A is more complex, however, as
illustrated in panel C of Figure 1. There are two levels of X at which the trading level is
unchanged as A changes. These are denoted X∗2 and X
∗∗
2 . From the Figure, we see that
for X < X∗2 and X > X
∗∗
2 , trading increases with a fall in A. However, for X
∗
2 < X < X
∗∗
2
trading falls, with a reduction in A.
Finally, we study the comparative statics results from the change in the relative number of
agents: ρ = m/n. We have the following:
Corollary 3 [Changes in the Relative Numbers of Agents and Trading]
Holding the average expected background income, A, and the difference, ∆ fixed, i.e. holding
A, am fixed:
(a) the effect of a change in the relative number of agents, ρ, is given by:
∂x∗m1
∂ρ
= 0 (40)
∂x∗n1
∂ρ
= ∆(1− β(X +A)). (41)
(b) the effect of a change in ρ on the trading of m-type agents is zero, while the trading
of n-type agents will be affected as follows:
∂z∗n1
∂ρ
= |∆(1− β(X +A))| > 0. (42)
The intuition for this trading behavior is as follows. When am and A are fixed, agent m’s
demand will not change. However, since the proportion ρ = mn increases, there must be
fewer n-type agents per m-type agent. Hence, the trading of each n-type agent increases.
The result in Corollary 3a) is illustrated in Figure 1, panel D. The solid line and the dotted
line shows the excess demand for agents of type m and n respectively, when ρ = 1. When ρ
increases, the steepness of the n-type agent’s demand curve increases to that shown by the
dotted-dashed line for the case where ρ = 2.
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5 The General Case: Partial Resolution of Uncertainty at
t = 1
As we saw earlier, in the general case where there is unresolved background risk at time 1, the
optimal demand, xi, cannot be solved analytically in closed-form. In the previous section,
the problem was solved by considering a special case where all background risk was resolved
at time 1, and the precautionary premium, ψi, was zero. We now analyze the general case,
using an alternative approach involving an approximation for the precautionary premium.
5.1 An Approximation for the Precautionary Premium.
At time 1, the residual background risk is ηi with variance σ
2
η , which we will assume is
the same across agents.11 From Gollier (2001), the precautionary premium, ψi, can be
approximated by12
ψi(xi) ≈
1
2
(
−
u′′′i (xi + ai)
u′′i (xi + ai)
)
σ2η (43)
for a small background risk. This is analogous to the Arrow-Pratt approximation for the
risk premium, using the marginal utility function instead of the original utility function.
For the special case where u(·) is CRRA analyzed earlier, we have
ψi(xi) ≈
(1 + γ)σ2η
2(xi + ai)
. (44)
11Generalizing this to the case of heterogeneity of variances across agents adds notational complexity
without yielding any additional insights.
12See Gollier (2001), p. 237.
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Thus, we have an approximate solution for ψi as a function of xi.
13
5.2 Optimal demand given the approximation for ψi
From equation (16), the optimal demand for members of the two groups of agents is:
xm1 =
E1[(X +A− ψ1)
−γ(X + am − ψm1)]
E1[(X +A− ψ1)1−γ ]
(X +A− ψ1)− am + ψm1 (45)
xn1 =
E1[(X +A− ψ1)
−γ(X + an − ψn1)]
E1[(X +A− ψ1)1−γ ]
(X +A− ψ1)− an + ψn1, (46)
where
ψm1 =
(1 + γ)σ2η
2(xm1 + am)
ψn1 =
(1 + γ)σ2η
2(xn1 + an)
ψ1 =
1
1 + ρ
(ρψm1 + ψn1)
The optimal demands of the two types of agent are implicit in equations (45) and (46).
However, in the appendix we show, using approximations, that the following proposition
holds in the general case:
Proposition 2 [Demand for Contingent Claims: General Case]
13As we can see, the approximation satisfies all the properties for the precautionary premium, ψi, as stated
in FSS:
ψi > 0,
∂ψi
∂x
< 0,
∂2ψi
∂x2
> 0,
∂ψi
∂σ
> 0,
∂2ψi
∂σ∂x
< 0,
∂3ψi
∂σ∂x2
> 0.
Also, the approximation has additional implications with respect to the change in the expectation of the
background risk ai:
∂ψi
∂ai
< 0,
∂2ψi
∂a2i
> 0
Finally, the cross derivatives with respect to σ and ai are similar to those for σ and xi.
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The optimal demand of the two groups of agents in the general case is:
xm1 = x
∗
m1 +
(1+γ)σ2η
2
(
B1m(X +A) +B2m
1
(X+A)
)
(47)
xn1 = x
∗
n1 +
(1+γ)σ2η
2
(
B1n(X +A) +B2n
1
(X+A)
)
, (48)
where
B1m =
βδ∆
(1 +∆β)(1 − ρ∆β)
{β(2 + (1− ρ)∆β) + γ(1 + (1− ρ)∆β)(θ − β)},
B2m =
−∆β[2 + (1− ρ)∆β]
(1 + ∆β)(1− ρ∆β)
,
and14
θ =
E1[(X +A)
−2−γ ]
E1[(X +A)−1−γ ]
and B1n = −ρB1m and B2n = −ρB2m.
Proof See Appendix B.
The main properties of the optimal demand and trading function can be analyzed using
x∗m1, x
∗
n1, the full-resolution demands for agentm and n respectively, as the base case. Recall
that in the special case of full resolution, x∗m1 has the property that when ∆ > 0, x
∗
m1−X,
the amount of trading, is an upward sloping, linear function of states X; and when ∆ < 0,
x∗m1 −X is a downward sloping linear function of states X.
The additional effect in the general case comes from two terms: one from the linear term
B1m(X + A), and the other from the nonlinear term, B2m/(X + A). From the above
proposition, note that the coefficients B1m, B2m are still functions of ∆, the difference
across the agents’ expected background income. However, the relationship is not linear
anymore. To see this in more detail, consider the special case of ρ = 1 when there are equal
numbers of agents in the two groups. Then, the two coefficients are:
B1m =
βδ∆
1−∆2β2
{2β + γ(θ − β)}
B2m =
−2∆β
1−∆2β2
Given θ > β, the coefficient of the additional linear term, B1m, is proportional to ∆/(1 −
∆2β2). The coefficient of the nonlinear term, B2m, is proportional to −∆/(1−∆
2β2). Thus,
14Again θ is analogous to δ and β, in that we start with the second derivative of the (derived) utility
function instead of the utility function as the basis.
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the nonlinear term can be upward or downward sloping in the state X, depending on the
sign of B2m. However, the term 1/(X + A) is always a decreasing and convex function of
the states X, it follows that:
Corollary 4 [Convexity of the Contingent Claim Demand]
Assuming ∆ < 0, the effect of unresolved background risk on the demand of each m-type
agent is a decreasing convex function of X.
Proof
From equation (26),
x∗m1 = X +∆β(X +A)−∆,
or
x∗m1 + am = (X +A)(1 + ∆β).
Now, X + A is positive by assumption. Also, we must have x∗m1 + am > 0 and it follows
that (1 + ∆β) > 0.
First, consider the coefficient of the linear term:
B1m =
βδ∆
(1 +∆β)(1 − ρ∆β)
{β(2 + (1− ρ)∆β) + γ(1 + (1− ρ)∆β)(θ − β)}.
Let us look at the terms on the right hand side one by one. The first fraction, βδ∆(1+∆β)(1−ρ∆β) ,
is negative. This is because β > 0, δ > 0, and ∆ < 0, (1 + ∆β) > 0, (1 − ρ∆β) > 0. The
second term, β(2 + (1 − ρ)∆β), is positive, since (2 + (1 − ρ)∆β) > 1 + ∆β > 0. The
third term, γ(1 + (1 − ρ)∆β)(θ − β) > 0, since 1 + (1− ρ)∆β > 1 + ∆β > 0, and θ > β.15
Combining together, it follows that B1m < 0. The additional linear term is thus downward
sloping.
Now consider the coefficient of the non-linear term:
B2m =
−∆β[2 + (1− ρ)∆β]
(1 + ∆β)(1− ρ∆β)
.
The denominator is positive as noted above. Also, the term within the brackets in the
numerator, [2 + (1− ρ)∆β] > 1 +∆β > 0. Hence, B2m is also positive since ∆β < 0. Since
1/(X + A) is downward sloping and convex, the non-linear term is also the same and the
corollary follows.
15See the proofs of the relationship between θ, δ, β in the appendix A.
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Corollary 4 shows how the convexity of the demand for contingent claims is affected by the
expected background income of agents. Also, since the β coefficient is a function of the
risk aversion parameter γ, it shows that in the CRRA economy, γ controls the degree of
convexity of the demand function.
Combining this result with the linear demand from B1m, it follows that, in addition to the
linear demand from the full resolution case, the effect of the residual risk on the demand
of agent is either a downward sloping convex or an upward sloping concave function of the
states X. Note also that when the difference ∆ > 0 (with m being the agent with positive
excess expected background income) then agent m’s demand will be increasing and concave.
The convexity/concavity of the demands and resultant trading that is generated by shocks to
the expected background income justifies trading in both the aggregate asset and contingent
claims, such as the options based on it.
In Figure 2, we illustrate the demand for claims in the general case using an example. As
with the previous examples of the special case, there are 12 states with equal probability.
In the absence of residual uncertainty the excess demand for claims x∗m1−X is a downward
sloping linear function ofX (shown by the solid line). In the presence of residual uncertainty,
the excess demand for claims xm1 −X is a declining, convex function of X (shown by the
dashed line). The convexity is better illustrated by the difference xm1− x
∗
m1 (shown by the
dotted line).
6 Conclusion
There is an extensive literature on background risk, which arises from stochastic cash flows
generating non-marketable wealth. Since this risk cannot be directly hedged, it affects the
derived risk aversion of the individual agent. Generally speaking, as documented by several
researchers and synthesized by Gollier (2001), in the presence of background risk, agents
generally become more risk-averse in their derived utility functions, and thus, behave like
more risk-averse agents would, in the absence of such a risk. This, in turn, influences the
demand for insurance.
There has been rather less attention devoted to the pricing of securities and sharing rules in
equilibrium, when agents in the economy face background risk. A notable early exception is
by FSS, who analyze the equilibrium in such an economy, and derive the portfolio demand
of individual agents in this equilibrium. The agents take into account their non-marketable
background risk in optimally determining their demand for the marketable assets. Specifi-
cally, FSS show that agents with background risk depart from the linear sharing rule that
Background Risk and Trading 20
characterizes behavior in complete markets, and may buy or sell non-linear contingent claims
such as options.
In this paper, we take the presence of background risk and its influence on risk taking in
a different direction. We explore how the prices of assets are determined in equilibrium by
the interplay of portfolio demands across agents in the economy, which take into account
the background risks they face. If the agents face different background risks, it is reasonable
to expect that their portfolio demands will differ: this is the argument first made by FSS.
We extend this argument to the multi-period setting and derive the changes in the portfolio
demand of different agents as the background risk is revealed over time. To the extent that
these changes differ across agents, it establishes a motive for trading, even in the presence
of symmetric (full) information across agents.
The equilibrium we obtain turns out to be fairly complex, since portfolio demands depend
on the changed derived risk aversion of agents in the presence of background risk, which
in turn, depends on the portfolio holdings. We break this circularity by considering special
cases of the evolution of background risk, as well as by using some approximations. We
confirm these results by numerical computations. We stress that the shocks to the expected
background income and their heterogeneity across agents generates trading in the aggregate
asset and contingent claims on the asset.
We have thus been able to derive a theory of trading in the presence of full information,
without running afoul of the powerful no-trade results of Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) and
Milgrom and Stokey (1982) in the context of asymmetric information models. We believe
our theory can be extended in several directions to separate the trading in linear (stocks
and bonds) versus non-linear (options) claims. Potentially, our theory is testable, if one can
quantify the influences of background risks such as human and housing wealth. This could
be of interest to researchers in asset pricing, where the focus is mainly on returns, but could
also be related to the aspects of trading analyzed in this paper.
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7 Appendix A: Proofs of δ > β and θ > β
We will actually prove a stronger result:
β < δ < θ, (49)
where
β =
E[(X +A)−γ ]
E[(X +A)1−γ ]
(50)
δ =
E[(X +A)−1−γ ]
E[(X +A)−γ ]
(51)
θ =
E[(X +A)−2−γ ]
E[(X +A)−1−γ ]
(52)
The required inequalities are explicitly the following:
E[(X +A)−γ ]
E[(X +A)1−γ ]
<
E[(X +A)−1−γ ]
E[(X +A)−γ ]
<
E[(X +A)−2−γ ]
E[(X +A)−1−γ ]
.
Define a ≡ (X +A) and x ≡ −γ < 0. Using these notations, the inequalities are then:
E(ax)
E(ax+1)
<
E(ax−1)
E(ax)
<
E(ax−2)
E(ax−1)
To show the first inequality:
E(ax)
E(ax+1)
<
E(ax−1)
E(ax)
,
we need to show:
(E(ax))2 < E(ax+1)E(ax−1).
But this follows directly from Cauchy-Schwarz inequality in probability: For any two ran-
dom variables X, Y,
|E(XY )|2 < E(X2)E(Y 2).
The situation for the next one is the same.
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8 Appendix B: Derivation of Demand Equations: The Gen-
eral Case
For convenience define:
xˆm1 ≡ xm1 + am
xˆn1 ≡ xn1 + an.
Then, it follows that the optimal demand for agent m can thus be written as:
xˆm1 =
E1[(X +A− ψ1)
−γ(X + am − ψm1)]
E1[(X +A− ψ1)1−γ ]
(X +A− ψ1) + ψm1,
where
ψm1 =
(1 + γ)σ2η
2xˆm1
ψn1 =
(1 + γ)σ2η
2xˆn1
ψ1 =
(1 + γ)σ2η
2(1 + ρ)
(
ρ
xˆm1
+
1
xˆn1
)
=
(1 + γ)σ2η
2xˆm1xˆn1
[
1
1 + ρ
(ρxˆn1 + xˆm1)
]
=
(1 + γ)σ2η
2xˆm1xˆn1
[
X +A+
1− ρ
1 + ρ
(xˆm1 − xˆn1)
]
=
(1 + γ)σ2η
2xˆm1xˆn1
(X +A)(1 + ∆xˆm1xˆn1),
and
∆xˆm1xˆn1 ≡
1− ρ
1 + ρ
·
xˆm1 − xˆn1
X +A
=
1− ρ
1 + ρ
·
(xm1 − xn1) + (am − an)
X +A
Similarly, the optimal demand for agent n is
xˆn1 =
E1[(X +A− ψ1)
−γ(X + am − ψm1)]
E1[(X +A− ψ1)1−γ ]
(X +A− ψ1) + ψn1,
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The required approximations are:
(X +A− ψ1)
−γ =
[
X +A−
(1 + γ)σ2η
2
X +A
xˆm1xˆn1
(1 + ∆xˆm1xˆn1)
]
−γ
= (X +A)−γ
[
1−
(1 + γ)σ2η
2xˆm1xˆn1
(1 + ∆xˆm1xˆn1)
]
−γ
≈ (X +A)−γ
[
1 +
γ(γ + 1)σ2η
2xˆm1xˆn1
(1 + ∆xˆm1xˆn1)
]
,
where in the last step we use the approximation that σ2η/(xˆm1xˆn1) is small.
Similarly, we obtain the approximation:
(X +A− ψ1)
1−γ ≈ (X +A)1−γ
[
1−
(1− γ2)σ2η
2xˆm1xˆn1
(1 +∆xˆm1xˆn1)
]
.
Thus:
1
E1
{
(X +A)1−γ
[
1−
(1−γ2)σ2η
2xˆm1xˆn1
(1 + ∆xˆm1xˆn1)
]} ≈ 1
E1[(X +A)1−γ ]

1 +
E1
[
(1−γ2)σ2η(X+A)
1−γ
2xˆm1xˆn1
(1 + ∆xˆm1xˆn1)
]
E1[(X +A)1−γ ]


Substituting these into the optimal demand function, it follows:
xˆm1 ≈ E1
[
(X +A)−γ
(
1 +
γ(γ + 1)σ2η
2xˆm1xˆn1
(1 + ∆xˆm1xˆn1)
)(
X + am −
(1 + γ)σ2η
2xˆm1
)]
1
E1[(X +A)1−γ ]

1 +
E1
(
(1−γ2)σ2η(X+A)
1−γ
2xˆm1xˆn1
(1 + ∆xˆm1xˆn1)
)
E1[(X +A)1−γ ]


(
X +A−
(1 + γ)σ2η(X +A)
2xˆm1xˆn1
(1 + ∆xˆm1xˆn1)
)
+
(1 + γ)σ2η
2xˆm1
.
Then, under our assumption the terms σ4/xˆ4m1, σ
4/xˆ3m1xˆn1, σ
4/xˆ2m1xˆ
2
n1 → 0. Thus we have:
xˆm1 ≈ E1
[
(X +A)−γ
(
X + am +
γ(1 + γ)σ2η(X + am)
2xˆm1xˆn1
(1 + ∆xˆm1xˆn1)−
(γ + 1)σ2η
2xˆm1
)]
(X +A)
E[(X +A)1−γ ]
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
1− (1 + γ)σ
2
η
2xˆm1xˆn1
(1 + ∆xˆm1xˆn1) +
E1
(
(1−γ2)σ2η(X+A)
1−γ
2xˆm1xˆn1
(1 + ∆xˆm1xˆn1)
)
E1[(X +A)1−γ ]

+ (1 + γ)σ
2
η
2xˆm1
=
{
E1[(X +A)
−γ(X + am)]
E1[(X +A)1−γ ]
(X +A)
+
(1 + γ)σ2η(X +A)
2E1[(X +A)1−γ ]
[
E1
(
γ(X +A)−γ(X + am)
xˆm1xˆn1
(1 + ∆xˆm1xˆn1)
)
− E1
(
(X +A)−γ
xˆm1
)]}

1− (1 + γ)σ2η
2xˆm1xˆn1
(1 + ∆xˆm1xˆn1) +
(1 + γ)σ2η
2
E1
(
(1−γ)(X+A)1−γ
xˆm1xˆn1
(1 + ∆xˆm1xˆn1)
)
E1[(X +A)1−γ ]

+ (1 + γ)σ2η
2xˆm1
Further, combining terms in the above expression, it follows:
xˆm1 ≈
E1[(X +A)
−γ(X + am)]
E1[(X +A)1−γ ]
(X +A)
+
(1 + γ)σ2η
2E1[(X +A)1−γ ]
(X +A)
[
E1
(
γ(X +A)−γ(X + am)
xˆm1xˆn1
(1 + ∆xˆm1xˆn1)
)
− E1
(
(X +A)−γ
xˆm1
)]
−
(1 + γ)σ2η
2xˆm1xˆn1
E1[(X +A)
−γ(X + am)]
E1[(X +A)1−γ ]
(X +A)(1 + ∆xˆm1xˆn1)
+
(1 + γ)σ2η
2
E1
(
(1−γ)(X+A)1−γ
xˆm1xˆn1
(1 + ∆xˆm1xˆn1)
)
E1[(X +A)1−γ ]
E1[(X +A)
−γ(X + am)]
E1[(X +A)1−γ ]
(X +A) +
(1 + γ)σ2η
2xˆm1
=
E1[(X +A)
−γ(X + am)]
E1[(X +A)1−γ ]
(X +A)
+
(1 + γ)σ2η
2E1[(X +A)1−γ ]
{[
E1
(
γ(X +A)−γ(X + am)
xˆm1xˆn1
(1 + ∆xˆm1xˆn1)
)
− E1
(
(X +A)−γ
xˆm1
)
+E1
[
(X +A)−γ((X + am)
] E1 ( (1−γ)(X+A)1−γxˆm1xˆn1 (1 + ∆xˆm1xˆn1)
)
E1[(X +A)1−γ ]

 (X +A)
− E1[(X +A)
−γ(X + am)]
(X +A)
xˆm1xˆn1
(1 + ∆xˆm1xˆn1) +
E1((X +A)
1−γ)
xˆm1
}
Finally, the approximate explicit solution is found by substituting xˆm1 = xˆ
∗
m1, xˆn1 = xˆ
∗
n1
to obtain
xˆm1 ≈ xˆ
∗
m1 +
(1 + γ)σ2η
2E1[(X +A)1−γ ]
{[
E1
(
γ(X +A)−γ(X + am)
xˆ∗m1xˆ
∗
n1
(1 +∆xˆ∗m1xˆ
∗
n1
)
)
− E1
(
(X +A)−γ
xˆ∗m1
)
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+ E1
[
(X +A)−γ(X + am)
] E1 ( (1−γ)(X+A)1−γxˆ∗m1xˆ∗n1 (1 + ∆xˆ∗m1xˆ∗n1)
)
E1[(X +A)1−γ ]

 (X +A)
− E1[(X +A)
−γ(X + am)]
(X +A)
xˆ∗m1xˆ
∗
n1
(1 + ∆xˆ∗m1xˆ∗n1) +
E1((X +A)
1−γ)
xˆ∗m1
}
= xˆ∗m1 +
(1 + γ)σ2η
2
{
B1m(X +A)−
E1[(X +A)
−γ(X + am)](X +A)
E1((X +A)1−γ)xˆ∗m1xˆ
∗
n1
(1 + ∆xˆ∗m1xˆ∗n1) +
1
xˆ∗m1
}
= xˆ∗m1 +
(1 + γ)σ2η
2
[
B1m(X +A) +B2m
1
(X +A)
]
,
where
B1m =
1
E1[(X +A)1−γ ]
[
E1
(
γ(X +A)−γ(X + am)
xˆ∗m1xˆ
∗
n1
(1 + ∆xˆ∗m1xˆ
∗
n1
)
)
− E1
(
(X +A)−γ
xˆ∗m1
)
+ E1
[
(X +A)−γ(X + am)
] E1 ( (1−γ)(X+A)1−γxˆ∗m1xˆ∗n1 (1 + ∆xˆ∗m1xˆ∗n1)
)
E1[(X +A)1−γ ]

 ,
B2m =
E1[(X +A)
1−γ ]
E1[(X +A)−γ(X + am)]
−
E1[(X +A)
1−γ ]
E1[(X +A)−γ(X + an)]
(1 + ∆xˆ∗m1xˆ∗n1).
Using the expression for x∗m1, x
∗
n1, we can obtain an explicit expression for ∆xˆ∗m1xˆ
∗
n1
:
∆xˆ∗m1xˆ∗n1 =
1− ρ
1 + ρ
(x∗m1 + am)− (x
∗
n1 + an)
X +A
=
1− ρ
1 + ρ
E1[(X+A)−γ(X+am)]
E1[(X+A)1−γ ]
(X +A)− E1[(X+A)
−γ(X+an)]
E1[(X+A)1−γ ]
(X +A)
X +A
=
1− ρ
1 + ρ
(am − an)E1[(X +A)
−γ ]
E1[(X +A)1−γ ]
=
(1− ρ)∆E1[(X +A)
−γ ]
E1[(X +A)1−γ ]
= (1− ρ)∆β.
We can further simplify the explicit expression for the two coefficients B1m, B2m. Note that:
B2m =
E1[(X +A)
1−γ ]
E1[(X +A)−γ(X + am)]
−
E1[(X +A)
1−γ ]
E1[(X +A)−γ(X + an)]
(1 + ∆xˆ∗m1xˆ∗n1),
where
∆xˆ∗m1xˆ∗n1 =
(1− ρ)∆E1[(X +A)
−γ ]
E1[(X +A)1−γ ]
= (1− ρ)∆β.
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Furthermore:
E1[(X +A)
1−γ ]
E1[(X +A)−γ(X + am)]
=
E1[(X +A)
1−γ ]
E1[(X +A)−γ(X +A+ am −A)]
=
E1[(X +A)
1−γ ]
E1[(X +A)1−γ ] + ∆E1[(X +A)−γ ]
=
1
1 + ∆β
E1[(X +A)
1−γ ]
E1[(X +A)−γ(X + an)]
=
E1[(X +A)
1−γ ]
E1[(X +A)−γ(X +A+ an −A)]
=
E1[(X +A)
1−γ ]
E1[(X +A)1−γ ]− ρ∆E1[(X +A)−γ ]
=
1
1− ρ∆β
It follows that:
B2m =
1
1 +∆β
−
1 + (1− ρ)∆β
1− ρ∆β
=
1− ρ∆β − [1 + (1− ρ)∆β](1 +∆β)
(1 + ∆β)(1 − ρ∆β)
=
1− ρ∆β − (1 + ∆β)−∆β(1− ρ)(1 + ∆β)
(1 + ∆β)(1− ρ∆β)
=
−∆β[1 + ρ+ 1− ρ+∆β − ρ∆β]
(1 + ∆β)(1− ρ∆β)
=
−∆β[2 + (1− ρ)∆β]
(1 + ∆β)(1− ρ∆β)
Now for B2m, note that:
xˆ∗m1 =
E1[(X +A)
−γ(X + am)]
E1[(X +A)1−γ
(X +A)
= (1 + ∆β)(X +A),
xˆ∗n1 =
E1[(X +A)
−γ(X + an)]
E1[(X +A)1−γ
(X +A)
= (1− ρ∆β)(X +A).
Then
xˆ∗m1xˆ
∗
n1 = (1 + ∆β)(1 − ρ∆β)(X +A)
2.
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It follows that:
B1m =
1
E1[(X +A)1−γ ]
{
1 + (1− ρ)∆β
(1 + ∆β)(1 − ρ∆β)
γE1[(X +A)
−2−γ(X +A+∆)]
−
E1[(X +A)
−1−γ ]
1 + ∆β
+
1 + (1− ρ)∆β
(1 +∆β)(1 − ρ∆β)
(1− γ)E1[(X +A)
−1−γ ](1 + ∆β)
}
=
1 + (1− ρ)∆β
(1 + ∆β)(1− ρ∆β)
γ
[
E1[(X +A)
−1−γ ]
E1[(X +A)1−γ ]
+ ∆
E1[(X +A)
−2−γ ]
E1[(X +A)1−γ ]
]
−
1
1 + ∆β
E1[(X +A)
−1−γ ]
E1[(X +A)1−γ ]
+
1 + (1− ρ)∆β
1− ρ∆β
(1− γ)
E1[(X +A)
−1−γ ]
E1[(X +A)1−γ ]
Define
θ ≡
E1[(X +A)
−2−γ ]
E1[(X +A)−1−γ ]
.
We can rewrite the following:
E1[(X +A)
−1−γ ]
E1[(X +A)1−γ ]
=
E1[(X +A)
−1−γ ]
E1[(X +A)−γ ]
E1[(X +A)
−γ ]
E1[(X +A)1−γ ]
= βδ
E1[(X +A)
−2−γ ]
E1[(X +A)1−γ ]
=
E1[(X +A)
−2−γ ]
E1[(X +A)−1−γ ]
E1[(X +A)
−1−γ ]
E1[(X +A)−γ ]
E1[(X +A)
−γ ]
E1[(X +A)1−γ ]
= βδθ.
Hence
B1m =
1 + (1− ρ)∆β
(1 +∆β)(1 − ρ∆β)
γ [βδ +∆βδθ]
−
1
1 + ∆β
βδ +
1 + (1− ρ)∆β
1− ρ∆β
(1− γ)βδ
=
βδ
(1 +∆β)(1 − ρ∆β)
[(1 + (1− ρ)∆β)γ(1 + ∆θ)−
−(1− ρ∆β) + (1 + ∆β)(1 + (1− ρ)∆β)(1− γ)]
=
βδ
(1 +∆β)(1 − ρ∆β)
{(1 + (1− ρ)∆β)[γ(1 + ∆θ) + (1 + ∆β)(1− γ)]− (1− ρ∆β)}
=
βδ
(1 +∆β)(1 − ρ∆β)
{(1 + (1− ρ)∆β)[(1 + ∆β) + γ∆(θ − β)]− (1− ρ∆β)}
=
βδ
(1 +∆β)(1 − ρ∆β)
{(1 + (1− ρ)∆β)(1 + ∆β)− (1− ρ∆β)
+γ(1 + (1− ρ)∆β)∆(θ − β)}
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=
βδ∆
(1 +∆β)(1 − ρ∆β)
{β(2 + (1− ρ)∆β) + γ(1 + (1− ρ)∆β)(θ − β)}
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Panel A: Changing ∆ Panel B: Demand for changing A
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Panel C: Trading for changing A Panel D:Changing ρ
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Figure 1: Special Case
This figure shows the results for the special case. We assume a uniform distribution across
12 states, which takes the value 2, 3, . . . , 13:
Panel A denotes the optimal excess demand of the two agents when there is a change in ∆.
Here, A = 0 and ρ = 1. The solid line is for x∗m1 −X with ∆ = −1; The dashed line is for
x∗m1−X with ∆ = −3; The dotted line is for x
∗
n1−X with ∆ = −1; and the dotted dashed
line is for x∗n1 −X with ∆ = −3.
Panel B denotes the optimal excess demand of the two agents when there is a change in A,
holding ∆ = −0.5 and ρ = 1. The solid line is for x∗m1 −X with A = 0; The dashed line is
for x∗m1 −X with A = −1; The dotted line is for x
∗
n1 −X with A = 0; The dotted dashed
line is for x∗n1 −X with A = −1.
Panel C denotes the trading by agent m when there is a change in A, holding ∆ = −0.5
and ρ = 1. The solid line is the trading zm1 with A = 0; The dashed line is the trading zm1
with A = −1.
Panel D denotes the optimal excess demand of the two agents when there is a change in ρ,
holding A,∆ fixed. The solid line (and the overlapping dashed line) is for x∗m1; The dotted
line is for x∗n1 −X with ρ = 1; The dotted dashed line is for x
∗
n1 −X with ρ = 2.
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Figure 2: General Case
This figure shows the demands for general case. We assume a uniform distribution across
12 states, which takes the value 2, 3, . . . , 13:
The solid line shows the linear excess demand of agent m in the special case where σ = 0.
The dashed line shows the non-linear excess demand of agent m in the general case where
σ > 0.
The dotted line shows the negative sloping convex additional demand of agent m in the
general case where σ > 0.
